Zoning the Internet: A New Approach to Protecting Children Online

This Article considers how Internet architecture can be harnessed to create an online environment where government regulation of material harmful to minors can be effective but not unreasonably burdensome. It proposes a solution that engages technology in refocusing the point of regulation, thereby reducing the burden on speech and increasing the ability to achieve constitutionally recognized governmental objectives. This Article briefly examines failed congressional attempts to restrict children\u27s access to sexually explicit content online, and then introduces the Internet Community Ports Concept, which relies on channeling technology to divide kinds of content among various Internet ports. After briefly outlining the technological workings of the Internet, this Article describes the Internet Community Ports Act (ICPA), which supports and enforces the zoning divisions. Together technology and legislation can create safe places forchildren and families on the Internet. The bulk of the Article discusses the constitutional implications of ICPA and how it will survive even strict scrutiny. Finally, it responds to a variety of other issues, such as market disincentives to separating content, the failed Dot Kids approach, the risk of chilled speech, stigma, and over-blocking, and the problems with filters

Lawyers\u27 Abuse of Technology

Lawyers are highly educated and, allegedly, of higher than average intelligence, but sometimes individual lawyers demonstrate colossal errors in judgment, especially when insufficiently trained in the new and emerging risks involved with the technological age. For instance, although the internet is a necessary tool for attorneys\u27 and is now a prominent feature in the everyday lives of all actors in the legal system, this technology poses particularized and often unanticipated risks of professional and ethical abuse -- risks that are extraordinary both in quantity and intensity. As Harvard\u27s Director of the Center for the Legal Profession warned: We are only at the forefront of seeing the kind of changes that technology is likely to bring to legal practice, and these changes will have a profound effect on how we think about regulating lawyers. Unfortunately, the American Bar Association (ABA) missed an opportunity it had with its own Ethics 20/20 Commission to address meaningful changes in the practice of law wrought by technology. However, the opportunities for unethical and unprofessional behavior in the use of electronic communications and storage cannot be ignored. This Article assesses the risks of technology abuse and proposes a scheme for addressing the professional and ethical problems that have and will continue to accompany the shift to digital lawyering

Lawyers\u27 Abuse of Technology

Lawyers are highly educated and, allegedly, of higher than average intelligence, but sometimes individual lawyers demonstrate colossal errors in judgment, especially when insufficiently trained in the new and emerging risks involved with the technological age. For instance, although the internet is a necessary tool for attorneys\u27 and is now a prominent feature in the everyday lives of all actors in the legal system, this technology poses particularized and often unanticipated risks of professional and ethical abuse -- risks that are extraordinary both in quantity and intensity. As Harvard\u27s Director of the Center for the Legal Profession warned: We are only at the forefront of seeing the kind of changes that technology is likely to bring to legal practice, and these changes will have a profound effect on how we think about regulating lawyers. Unfortunately, the American Bar Association (ABA) missed an opportunity it had with its own Ethics 20/20 Commission to address meaningful changes in the practice of law wrought by technology. However, the opportunities for unethical and unprofessional behavior in the use of electronic communications and storage cannot be ignored. This Article assesses the risks of technology abuse and proposes a scheme for addressing the professional and ethical problems that have and will continue to accompany the shift to digital lawyering

CyberInfants

Teens have emerged as a significant market segment, especially with respect to online goods and services. This increased market presence is likely to foreground the contract infancy doctrine, which permits a person under age eighteen to void a contract with a few exceptions. This article provides solid foundations for a discussion of where the doctrine fits in the face of a rising youth market and the digital revolution. Part II covers the general parameters of the infancy doctrine and dispels the notion that the doctrine will not be applicable to online services. This part critiques the one case that has addressed the infancy doctrine in the online arena — A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC. Although this case appears to create or expand an infancy doctrine defense based on the use of benefits, the court misapplies the law. Part II also addresses a possible secondary explanation of iParadigms and the seemingly eternal question of whether the infancy doctrine can be used as a “sword,” whatever that means in various jurisdictions and contexts. It then explores a variety of infancy doctrine defenses and illustrates that they are sufficiently narrow to provide little comfort for online vendors and service providers. Part III focuses on the peculiarities of online contracting. It briefly provides context for the current state of contract law doctrine and the increasing laxity in maintaining traditional protections. This part then reviews the major objections to enforcing many terms of service or end-user agreements and assesses whether other contract doctrines provide sufficient basis for policing their abuses. Part III then concludes that, if the infancy doctrine needs to be limited to better accommodate current market needs, the online licensing agreement is not the best place to begin. Part IV predicts the collision of the infancy doctrine and a market ever more greedy to engage minors. It addresses minors’ economic power, whether online businesses are less at risk because they do not take cash, and the extent to which a parent or other entity secondarily guarantees the payment of online financial promises. It next considers the more subtle economic costs associated with minors’ ability to avoid contract terms even if the service is free or the right to payment is not challenged. Lastly, Part IV outlines the options available and offers recommendations for how online service providers could and should respond to an upswing in infancy doctrine claims. Certainly, the infancy doctrine may become an unmanageable factor in digital market economics. But dramatic changes in contract law should not occur without serious consideration of historical values and long-term implications, especially in an arena where the risk of contract abuses is increased. At least with respect to online agreements, the infancy doctrine should be enforced — and perhaps publicized to encourage its use

Women in Traditional Religions: Refusing to Let Patriarchy (or Feminism) Separate Us from the Source of Our Liberation

Law and Religion Symposiu